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Abstract
This analysis presents a number of correlations between EU Member States (MS)
judicial systems and indicators of firm performance. To measure the functioning of the
justice systems, we use indicators of efficiency, quality and independence. To measure
economic development, business statistics such as value added, turnover, value added per
worker and the number of enterprises are employed. Results show some strong correlations
between the length of court proceedings - a proxy for efficiency of the justice system -
and MS firm performance. At the same time, however, the correlations between economic
performances and some of the available measures capturing more complex facets of an
effective justice system, namely quality and independence, are less pronounced and robust.
Policy implications should be drawn with caution due to the small sample size and the
short time period available. Moreover, although our findings reveal interesting relations,
the evidence is best described as descriptive rather than causal.
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21 Introduction
The present study aims at exploring whether a nation?s judicial system affects its levels
of economic development. The main elements of an effective justice system are its efficiency,
quality and independence. To effectively assess the functioning of the judiciary, there are a
number of indicators that can be used and that fall into six main areas: efficiency, quality and
independence. At the same time, the state of the economy can be captured by indicators of
value added, turnover, value added per worker - a proxy for labor productivity - and the number
of enterprises. Results presented in this analysis should not be interpreted as establishing causal
relationships, because the economic outcomes we investigate are undoubtedly caused by many
other factors that cannot be observed, and therefore included in the analysis. Instead, our
results offer a broad and informative range of correlation patterns. If anything, the analyses
presented below can be helpful in steering future research efforts that intend to identify causal
mechanisms.
2 Data
Data on the justice systems are taken from the “2016 EU Justice Scoreboard” published by
the DG JUST. We use a long time series to explore whether the association between the judiciary
and business performances could be explained by the implementation of reformprocesses within
thenational justicesystems. We select a sub-set of indicators for each of the three areas that
identify an effective justice system, i.e. efficiency, quality and independence. The selection
of indicators has also been dictated by the availability of time series. Efficiency of a justice
system is measured by an indicator of the time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial
cases and the number of administrative pending cases. Quality of the judiciary is captured
by per capita total spending on law courts, the total number of judges and the number of
quality standards that MS adopted to monitor and assess the justice system. Independence is
measured by companies’ perception of judicial independence. Data on the economy of member
states are taken from the Structural Business Statistics, a database provided by Eurostat. In
3particular, the present study focus on indicators of firm performance, such as value added,
turnover, labour productivity measured as value added per worker, and number of enterprises.
For these variables, we use the average annual compound rate for the period 2010-14. We make
sure that data on economic performances and data on the judiciary systems cover the same
time window.
3 Empirical models
To estimate the effects of the judiciary on firm performance the following linear regression
model is used:
Yi = α + βJUSTi,2010 + γYi,2010 + εi (1)
where Yi is the average annual growth rate of real value added (real turnover, real value added
per worker as a proxy for labour productivity, number of enterprises) for country i. We take
the average over the period 2010-2014. Yi,2010 is the beginning-of-period real value added (real
turnover, real value added per worker, number of enterprises) and is meant to capture initial
differences that can influence subsequent variables’ growth rate. JUSTi,2010 is the level of
judiciary functioning in 2010, the starting year for our analysis. As mentioned above, the
multi-faceted nature of judicial performance and the efficiency of the justice system is captured
by the following indicators:
• the time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases (in days);
• the number of litigious civil and commercial pending cases (per 100 inhabitants).
Moreover, to capture the quality domain of the justice system the study uses
• the per capita total expenditure on law courts;
• the number of judges (per 100K inhabitants);
• the number of quality standard.
4Finally, to gauge independence of the court and judges the study uses:
• the businesses’ survey on perception of judicial independence.
To sum up, four linear regressions for each of the above mentioned indicators of justice
systems’ functioning are estimated.
All the independent variables are transformed into logs to scale down the variance and reduce
the effect of outliers. In so doing, the coefficients can be interpreted as a semi-elasticity. Due
to the small sample size, we need to explore the effect of each indicator for the justice system
separately. However, an additional model is also provided, where the three indicators, one for
each category (efficiency, quality and independence) are included simultaneously. Indicators
considered in this specification were chosen so as to safeguard sample size.
Yet, additional variables that might explain some or all the correlation between the output
variable and the indicator of justice cannot be included. Hence, results have to be interpreted
with caution. Estimates of regression model (1) might in part capture the effects of changes in
the judiciary occurred during the period 2010-14. This would be the case if countries with issues
in the functioning of their justice system had implemented relatively more incisive reforms. As
a consequence, the justice system has level effects on the output variable of interest. To explore
this possibility, the regression model (1) is augmented with the following variable ∆JUSTi =
JUSTi,2014−JUSTi,2010, that is increasing (decreasing) in the level of justice system functioning.
4 Results
Tables (1)-(4) report the results obtained from model (1). Figures (1)-(8) give a visual
interpretation of the regression results. More precisely, Figures (1-8) display the correlations
between the dependent (∆Yi) and independent variables (JUSTi,2010) while removing the influ-
ence of the beginning-of-period variable (Yi,2010). The superimposed red line is the prediction
for ∆Yi from the linear regression (1). The sign of coefficients are all consistent with the ex-
pectations, albeit they are statistically different from zero only in very few cases. For instance,
if we look at the effect of the length of proceedings, we find that a 1% increase in efficiency is
5predicted to boost the growth rate of value added by 0.03% (Table 1), to increase the growth
rate of turnover by 0.02% (Table 2), and to increase the growth rate of the number of firms
by 0.04%. Similar findings are obtained when the number of pending cases is the indicator for
efficiency. Yet, this negative association seems to remain robust to the inclusion of all judiciary
performance indicators (see models in columns viii).
Another important factor that appears to influence firm performance is independence. In
particular, businesses’ perception of judicial independence is significantly correlated with the
growth rate of turnover and productivity, while it seems not statistically associated with the
growth rate of number of enterprises and of value added. A 1% increase in the percentage of
companies that perceived the justice system as independent increments average growth rate of
turnover by 0.05% and that of productivity by 0.05%.
Since countries with challenges in the functioning of their justice system are more likely to
implement stronger justice reforms, and this could partly drive the statistical association be-
tween the justice system and firm performance, the regression models have been re-estimated
including the variable ∆JUSTi. This variable is meant to capture changes occurred in the
judiciary because of implementation of national reforms and remove its influence in the rela-
tionship of interest. This approach was used only for the models wherein time varying justice
indicators were factored in. The results are reported in Tables (5)-(7). There are only very
few results that remain robust to this check. For instance, while the coefficient of perceived
independence remains robust to all specifications, the length of proceedings is significant only
for the growth rate of the number of companies. Moreover, it seems there is a positive and
statistically significant effect of increasing the total expenditure on law courts, , which lifts all
indicators of business performance. However, one cannot exclude the possibility that this effect
is due to the overall increase in expenditure in response to the economic downturn.
65 Conclusion
This analysis explored whether a well-functioning judicial system is associated with eco-
nomic development. By using data from the “2016 EU Justice Scoreboard” and Structural
Business Statistics, the study finds strong statistically significant correlation between the length
of proceedings - a proxy for efficiency of the judiciary - and MS firm performance. On the other
hand, results for quality and independence of the judiciary are mixed. In particular, the study
cannot reject the hypothesis of no correlation between total spending on law courts, the num-
ber of judges, the number of quality standard and firm performance indicators. In addition, a
weak correlation (at conventional levels of statistical significance) is found between companies’
perceived independence of the justice system and economic development.
Our findings are subject to several caveats. First, one may be concerned with the small
sample size, which considerably hinders the confidence in our estimates by introducing bias in
the estimates or by producing spurious correlations. Small sample size also prevents generaliza-
tion of the results. Second, our model does not account for important factors that are difficult
to observe or quantify and that can drive both economic performances as well as the quality of
institutions, including the judiciary system. In addition, we confined our study to country-level
effects, rather than on the impact of the judicial system on local organizations. To dig deeper
into the relationship between the judicial system and economic development, more effort should
be devoted to the integration of court-level data with company-level information on business
characteristics.
7Table 1: Indicators of the functioning of justice system and the average growth rate (2010-14)
of value added
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Value added(2010) -1.14
∗∗ -0.22 -0.72 -0.81 -1.14∗∗ -0.85 -0.30 1.13∗∗
(0.504) (0.57) (0.42) (0.64) (0.40) (0.55) (0.62) (0.43)
Efficiency
Length of proceedings -3.34∗∗ -3.40∗∗
(1.31) (1.54)
Pending cases -1.71∗
(0.81)
Quality
Total spending -0.20 -0.23
(1.20) (1.43)
# of judges -0.58
(1.57)
# of standard -1.26
(1.42)
Independence
Perceived independence (WEF) 3.53 4.33
(2.49) (2.94)
R2 0.48 0.38 0.12 0.13 0.35 0.19 0.35 0.56
Countries 16 14 18 18 17 18 17 16
NOTE. - Ordinary least squares estimates given. A constant is included in every model but not shown. All independent variables
are in logs. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
8Table 2: Indicators of the functioning of justice system and the average growth rate (2010-14)
of turnover
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Turnover(2010) -0.81
∗ 0.00 -0.56 -0.49 -0.82∗∗ -0.59 -0.15 -0.92∗∗
(0.44) (0.38) (0.41) (0.51) (0.33) (0.47) (0.53) (0.36)
Efficiency
Length of proceedings -2.41∗∗ -2.65∗∗
(1.05) (1.16)
Pending cases -1.57∗∗
(0.56)
Quality
Total spending 0.65 0.33
(1.20) (1.11)
# of judges -0.62
(1.39)
# of standard -2.55
(1.52)
Independence
Perceived independence (WEF) 5.14∗∗ 5.64∗∗
(2.05) (2.34)
R2 0.322 0.402 0.077 0.072 0.284 0.268 0.280 0.562
Countries 16 14 18 18 17 18 17 16
NOTE. - Ordinary least squares estimates given. A constant is included in every model but not shown. All independent variables
are in logs. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
9Table 3: Indicators of the functioning of justice system and the average growth rate (2010-14)
of productivity
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Productivity(2010) -0.75 -0.76 -1.23 -0.86 -0.99 -2.59
∗∗ -0.48 -4.60∗∗
(0.71) (0.84) (1.31) (0.88) (1.04) (0.88) (0.53) (1.75)
Efficiency
Length of proceedings -0.64 -0.47
(0.98) (0.72)
Pending cases -0.71∗∗
(0.29)
Quality
Total spending 0.50 1.72
(1.32) (1.13)
# of judges -0.16
(0.86)
# of standard -0.89
(1.66)
Independence
Perceived independence (WEF) 5.60∗∗∗ 7.16∗∗∗
(1.32) (2.11)
R2 0.129 0.306 0.088 0.078 0.088 0.338 0.261 0.498
Countries 16 13 17 17 16 17 16 16
NOTE. - Ordinary least squares estimates given. A constant is included in every model but not shown. All independent variables
are in logs. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
10
Table 4: Indicators of the functioning of justice system and the average growth rate (2010-14)
of # enterprises
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
# enterprises(2010) -0.59 0.42 -0.02 -0.04 -0.21 0.10 0.50 -0.39
(0.57) (0.68) (0.59) (0.67) (0.77) (0.66) (0.67) (0.70)
Efficiency
Length of proceedings -4.11∗∗ -3.89∗∗
(1.11) (1.33)
Pending cases -0.81
(0.84)
Quality
Total spending -0.05 -0.90
(1.48) (0.97)
# of judges -0.27
(1.72)
# of standard 0.11
(2.33)
Independence
Perceived independence (WEF) 4.70 3.11
(2.95) (3.06)
R2 0.503 0.045 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.113 0.162 0.540
Countries 17 15 19 19 18 19 18 17
NOTE. - Ordinary least squares estimates given. A constant is included in every model but not shown. All independent variables
are in logs. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 1: Indicators of the functioning of justice system and the growth rate of value added
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Figure 2: Indicators of the functioning of justice system and the growth rate of value added
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Figure 3: Indicators of the functioning of justice system and the growth rate of turnover
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Figure 4: Indicators of the functioning of justice system and the growth rate of turnover
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Figure 5: Indicators of the functioning of justice system and the growth rate of productivity
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Figure 6: Indicators of the functioning of justice system and the growth rate of productivity
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Figure 7: JIndicators of the functioning of justice system and the growth rate of # enterprises
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Figure 8: Indicators of the functioning of justice system and the growth rate of # enterprises
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Table 5: Robustness check. Indicators of the functioning of justice system and the average
growth rate (2010-14) of value added
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Value added(2010) -1.36
∗∗ 0.01 -0.70∗∗ -0.78 -0.86
(0.46) (0.57) (0.29) (0.53) (0.56)
Efficiency
Length of proceedings -2.16
(1.34)
∆ Length of proceedings 0.34
(2.22)
Pending cases -1.39
(1.63)
∆ Pending cases 1.58
(2.29)
Quality
Total spending 1.38
(1.02)
∆ Total spending 10.77∗∗
(3.95)
# of judges 0.00
(1.47)
∆ # of judges 20.28
(13.99)
Independence
Perceived independence (WEF) 4.82∗∗
(2.21)
∆ Perceived independence (WEF) 5.03
(3.79)
R2 0.591 0.443 0.560 0.309 0.213
Countries 14 13 18 18 18
NOTE. - Ordinary least squares estimates given. A constant is included in every model but not shown. All independent variables
are in logs. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Robustness check. Indicators of the functioning of justice system and the average
growth rate (2010-14) of turnover
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Turnover(2010) -0.86
∗ 0.20 -0.59∗∗ -0.51 -0.60
(0.46) (0.45) (0.23) (0.41) (0.47)
Efficiency
Length of proceedings -1.93
(1.37)
∆ Length of proceedings -1.51
(2.40)
Pending cases -0.91
(1.25)
∆ Pending cases 1.56
(1.67)
Quality
Total spending 2.13∗∗
(0.84)
∆ Total spending 9.68∗∗∗
(2.88)
# of judges -0.17
(1.25)
∆ # of judges 16.90
(10.59)
Independence
Perceived independence (WEF) 6.09∗∗∗
(1.93)
∆ Perceived independence (WEF) 3.69
(3.41)
R2 0.390 0.401 0.589 0.252 0.285
Countries 14 13 18 18 18
NOTE. - Ordinary least squares estimates given. A constant is included in every model but not shown. All independent variables
are in logs. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 7: Robustness check. Indicators of the functioning of justice system and the average
growth rate (2010-14) of productivity
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Productivity(2010) -0.86 -0.60 -2.23
∗∗ -0.75 -2.59∗∗
(0.79) (1.03) (0.90) (0.74) (0.92)
Efficiency
Length of proceedings -0.70
(1.09)
∆ Length of proceedings -1.51
(2.40)
Pending cases 0.72
(1.16)
∆ Pending cases 1.56
(1.67)
Quality
Total spending 2.00∗∗
(0.70)
∆ Total spending 5.04∗∗∗
(1.36)
# of judges 0.23
(0.83)
∆ # of judges 10.26∗
(5.10)
Independence
Perceived independence (WEF) 5.30∗∗∗
(1.56)
∆ Perceived independence (WEF) -1.20
(2.98)
R2 0.165 0.344 0.439 0.243 0.343
Countries 14 12 17 17 17
NOTE. - Ordinary least squares estimates given. A constant is included in every model but not shown. All independent variables
are in logs. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8: Robustness check. Indicators of the functioning of justice system and the average
growth rate (2010-14) of # enterprises
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
# enterprises(2010) -0.94 0.75 0.17 -0.04 0.12
(0.62) (0.91) (0.58) (0.68) (0.66)
Efficiency
Length of proceedings -3.39∗∗
(1.14)
∆ Length of proceedings 2.82
(2.10)
Pending cases 0.10
(1.45)
∆ Pending cases 2.21
(3.17)
Quality
Total spending 0.90
(1.43)
∆ Total spending 6.83∗∗∗
(1.84)
# of judges -0.22
(1.92)
∆ # of judges 1.73
(15.08)
Independence
Perceived independence (WEF) 5.30∗∗∗
(1.56)
∆ Perceived independence (WEF) 4.99
(5.06)
R2 0.490 0.108 0.130 0.002 0.133
Countries 15 14 19 19 19
NOTE. - Ordinary least squares estimates given. A constant is included in every model but not shown. All independent variables
are in logs. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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